



January 18,2004 – February 1,2004



ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
Dora B. Schriro, Director











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
The Inmates

- Both had been confined most of their life
- Ricky Kurt Wassenaar
 - 40 yrs old
 - Serving 28 yrs for armed robbery & assault
 - Sociopath without regard for anyone
- Steven Coy
 - 39 yrs old
 - Serving Life for armed robbery, assault & rape
 - Loner












THE TOWER



Tower Construction

- 19.7 feet high
- Three stories
- 8"reinforced concrete block
- 2" Lexan/safety glass windows tilted out at 27 degree angle



Weapons

- AR 15 w/20 rounds of ammunition
- 12 gauge Remington 870 shotgun
- 37mm Federal gas gun
- Less lethal and chemical agent projectiles
- Stinger chemical agent grenades
- Diversion Devices



Tower Fortifications

- File cabinets against doors
- Stair well door locked chained with handcuffs
- Windows covered with ceiling tiles and other items
- Later inmate removed tarp from roof and used it to cover windows inside.



Perimeter Control

- Checkpoints were established on roads leading into the prison by AZDPS field units and ADC personnel
- A 3mile, 5000ft no fly zone around the Prison site was established by the FAA



Incident Command

Lead Agency

Department of Corrections

Support Agencies

Department of Public Safety

Maricopa County Sheriff's Department


Federal Bureau of Investigation






Obstacles-Morey's Rule

- Morey Unit and Tower were first built
- Various practices and testing of equipment were done on supposedly like towers prior to implementation at the Morey tower
- When operatives attempted actual deployments it was found that the Morey tower did not match the others
 - Conduit
 - Even architect with his plans found it different after cutting hole in wall in access conduit in “A” building




The Inmates-Perspective

- Dangerous Criminals
- Were used to confinement and therefore it did not bother them
- Were not out at night and therefore feared the night
- We had to impact their environment to be successful in negotiations and a tactical resolution
- Language problem with negotiators




Incident Command

- Tactical Operations Center
- Negotiations Center
- Executive Command Center
- Regular scheduled meetings
 - 1 hr, went to two then to three unless situation changed
 - Daily scheduled morning brief via speaker phone with Director and Governor
 - On site and speaker phone briefs with Director throughout the day



Law Enforcement Support

- AZDPS
- FBI
- Maricopa County Sheriff's Office
- Glendale Police Dept.
- Phoenix Police Dept.
- Tempe Police Dept.
- Scottsdale Police Dept.
- Mesa Police Dept.
- Tucson Police Dept.
- Maricopa County Attorney's Office
- FBI-HRT
- FBI-Behavioral Sciences
- ATFE
- Michigan State Police
- Los Angeles County SD
- U.S.Border Patrol




NEGOTIATIONS-Staffing

- AZDPS
- AZDOC
- Phoenix Police Department
- Maricopa County Sheriff's Office
- Tempe PD
- Federal Bureau of Investigation
- FBI Behavioral sciences unit
- Private psychologist
- A total of 30 negotiators were deployed
- 10 conducted negotiations with the inmates




NEGOTIATIONS

- VIA telephone
- ADC radio
- Attempted to introduce hostage phone
- Norstan unit
- Negotiators attempted to always get something in return for demands
 - Ammo
 - Hostage welfare check




NEGOTIATIONS

- Negotiations were generally conducted during daytime hours
 - Inmate life in confinement
- Inmates would end negotiations and close roof hatch cutting off contact till morning
- Some negotiations went into the late evening




Inmate Demands

- Food
- Handcuff key
- AM Radio
- Interstate Compact Transfer
- Wassenaar talk to sister and family
 - Talk to mom denied
- Coy talk to uncle & wife
- Transfer to U.S.Bureau of Prisons custody
- Personal hygiene
 - Inmates and hostages
- Not confined in state,local jail when returned for trial
- Clean clothes
- Water on
- Power on
- Media contact
 - Radio
 - TV
- Cigarettes



Hostage Welfare Checks

- Negotiation strategy was to see or talk to hostages daily
 - Evaluate condition
 - Let them know that they were not forgotten
- Medical evaluation-remaining hostage
 - See and evaluate-denied
 - Talked to para-medical and doctor



First Hostage Released-Day 7


- Negotiated release for:
 - Food items
 - Inmate store
 - Normal food
 - Deli meat
 - Cigarettes
 - Colas
 - **Water on**
- Male Officer released






Released Hostage debrief

- Number of 223 rounds left
- Shotgun
- Location of hostages
- Fortifications and methods of locking doors
- Stairwell door on access and closed at night
 - Push button to open




Use of Third Party Negotiators

- Interstate Compact was on the table day 2 But inmate Wassenaar did not believe it
- Negotiation strategy was to use Wassenaar's sister and Coy's uncle to convince
 - Used tape recordings at first
 - Flew inmate relatives to Arizona for on-site phone contact
 - Sister had minimal impact in final closure
 - Sister and Wassenaar's other relatives sent home



Use of Third Party Negotiators

- Coy's uncle was effective in dealing with the inmates
- Radio taped interview
 - Played after release
- Inmate Wassenaar requested a TV interview
 - Interview was approved by the TV station but never implemented




Tactical Preparations



- Hostage rescue components practiced daily on a live tower & mock tower built behind main assault staging location

Tactical Preparations

- All deployed snipers fired at targets behind tower like windows before deployment
- Tower floor plans and photos of inmates and hostages posted at staging locations



Tactical Operations

- Deployed snipers and observers to cover tower
- Maintained hostage rescue capability throughout the incident
- Delivered food and other items to tower
- Placed electronic surveillances devices in and on tower
- Prepared the fence line for assault
- Involved in psycops during evening hours



Tactical Operations -Snipers

- Sniper & observer teams covered tower 24/7
- Authorized to exercise deadly force options under standing warning orders





Tactical Operations -Snipers

- Observed and reported to tactical command movement in tower windows
 - Charted on tower floor plan in Tactical Command Center to determine consistency in movement



Tactical Operations -Sniper Positioning





Use of Force Orders

Immediate Tactical Sniper Resolution

- Both inmates positively observed at the same time: one on roof, one in window.
- Inmate on roof with hostage/s armed with a firearm and threatening hostage/s
- Inmate on roof with a weapon and threatening officers
- Hostage/s escapes to roof

Any of the above would initiate an immediate tactical assault




Tactical Resolution Plan

- Rapid response assault-Both shifts
 - Based on escalating circumstances within the tower
- Both shifts had a surrender plan in place



Use of Force Orders

- Snipers operated under established use of force options
- Snipers did not have to request permission from command to exercise these options
- At no time during this incident were both inmates observed and clearly identified at the same time



Tactical Operations-Hostage Rescue Components

- Hostage rescue components were staged in both 'A' & 'B' buildings
- Daytime hostage rescue plan would be launched from the 'B' building supported by the team from 'A' building
- Night hostage rescue plan would be launched from the 'A' building supported by assisting LE agency in the 'B' building




Assault Staging Locations



Intelligence

- ADC & DPS intelligence personnel provided information from:
 - Suspect inmates background and profile
 - Non-involved inmate interviews
 - Criminal investigation interviews
 - Inmate phone call monitoring
 - Inmate mail
 - Electronic surveillance device monitoring
 - Briefed teams daily



Intelligence



- ADC & DPS intelligence detectives worked throughout the incident with ADC facilities management personnel to develop strategies for deploying electronic devices and video surveillance systems

Technical Surveillance Challenges

- Tower construction
 - Walls and windows
- Distance
 - Commanding view of surrounding area.
 - 60 to 100 yards away from buildings



Technical Surveillance

- Attempted standoff intercepts, FLIR & thermal imaging
 - Laser could not penetrate windows
 - Parabolic microphone worked sparingly
 - Nothing worked from the required standoff distance
- Contacted
 - NASA
 - DOD
 - U.S. Department of Homeland Security
 - Arizona Office of Homeland Security
 - Private technology industry
 - Emergency Response Technology Group




Technical Surveillance-Video

- Video surveillance feeds were established:
 - Tactical Command Post – 4 tower views with ability to zoom
 - Negotiation Command post – 1 tower view
 - ADC Command Office- 1 tower view
- Video came from existing cameras and portable surveillance cameras installed by LE technical surveillance specialists




Technical Surveillance-Video




Technical Surveillance- Negotiation Support

- Phone recording capabilities
- Speakers installed in Negotiation and ADC Command Offices to allow monitoring of ongoing negotiations




Air Surveillance



Surveillance Aircraft

Daily Security Checks

- Morning ritual-between 0800 and 1000am
 - Checks for bugs and changes around tower
- **Leaned over tower to observe ground and tower walls below**




Operations-Deliveries



- Deliveries were initially made with a DPS robot
- Initially delivered items to pass through tray
- Later deliveries made to tower at ground level and inmate pulled items up to roof


Operations-Deliveries

- Placed and retrieved electronic devices
- Gained intelligence on tower fortifications
- Practiced movements to tower
- Inmates view of tower approaches were tested
- Opened gates to prepare area for tactical resolution




Medical Evaluation

- Para-med and doctor day 12
 - Seriously dehydrated, other potential life threaten. Critical 24-72 hours
 - Raised serious concerns and tactical resolution was discussed
- Second doctor
 - Reviewed tapes of paramedic interview
 - Not as Bad - 48-72 hours
- Third doctor day 13
 - Concerned and gave information on what to look for
- All agreed, hard to tell without examination




End Game Day 14

- Power to tower shut off
 - UPS system would run electric for 6-8hours
- Based on intelligence, debriefing released hostage and device monitoring Command knew:
 - With loss of power, stairwell door if closed would be locked denying access to 1st floor.
 - Water
 - Bathroom




End Game Day 14

- Tactical officers deliver food and open “B” side gates. Inmate Wassenaar realizes something is wrong with power and observes gates open as tactical officers leave
- Wassner becomes irate and comes onto tower roof carrying shotgun in non-threatening manner.
 - Snipers advised to follow use of force policy if threatened
 - Sniper action would have precipitated a tower assault




End Game Day15

- Inmates and hostage trapped on second floor
- Denied use of bathroom and water
- Attitude changed
- Wanted power on
- Talked of surrender
- Wanted to talk to previous police negotiator




End Game Day 15- Final Demands

- Clean clothes
- Steak meal
- 2 cans of beer
- Cigarettes
- Power back on
- Wassenaar wished to talk to his sister
- Power on
- Coy wanted to talk to his Uncle & View USBOP vehicles




End Game


- Command Decision Process
 - Met all demands but power
 - Power back on if inmate promised to release hostage and surrender today by 630pm
- Inmates agreed to surrender and release hostage
- Viewed Coy's uncle standing with USBOP Vehicles



End Game Day 15

- Power does not come on in tower due to inmates flipping breakers off
- Inmate comes on roof and fires baton round from 37mm gas gun
 - In response to power not coming on
 - Snipers maintain use of force discipline






Epilog

The longest prison hostage incident in U.S. history came to a peaceful end after 15 days on February 1, 2004. Both hostages were released and the inmates surrendered.

The successful peaceful resolution was due to the professionalism, creativity, patience and discipline of the correctional and law enforcement officers deployed during this crisis.







On February 3rd, immediately following resolution of the Lewis standoff, Governor Janet Napolitano ordered a thorough review of the sequence of events leading up to the hostage-taking, as well as an assessment of prison issues that may have directly or indirectly contributed to the incident. The Blue Ribbon Panel, co-chaired by former Arizona Attorney General Grant Woods, Director of the Arizona Department of Water Resources and former Arizona Senator Herb Guenther, and Governor's Chief of Staff Dennis Burke, began its open meetings on February 11.

The Panel's report includes more than 60 recommendations for improvements at the Lewis Prison and throughout the Department of Corrections. In the report, panel members identified "long-term institutional neglect and decay," along with "years' worth of bad decisions at all levels of the Arizona Department of Corrections," as factors contributing to the crisis.

Key findings include:

- Pat-down procedures were not followed.
- Kitchen duty was inappropriate for the two violent offenders.
- Kitchen office door was not locked.
- One officer was posted to supervise 19 inmates.
- Tower access required no positive identification protocols.
- Many officers at the Morey Unit have less than one year in uniform.
- The DOC inmate classification system is cumbersome and unreliable and has not been updated since the 1980's.
- Civilian and uniformed personnel training is insufficient.
- Correctional facilities are understaffed.
- DOC Officers are underpaid.
- Employment and promotional standards have been lowered.

Among the 60+ recommendations submitted to the Governor:

- Review and enforce search procedures.

STATE OF ARIZONA
EXECUTIVE OFFICE
JANET NAPOLITANO
GOVERNOR
WWW.GOVERNOR.STATE.AZ.US



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
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
March 4, 2004

***'BLUE RIBBON PANEL' RELEASES FINDINGS,
RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING LEWIS PRISON***

PHOENIX – After more than 50 hours of open hearings and testimony from nearly 100 witnesses, the Blue Ribbon Panel charged with reviewing details of the January 18th hostage situation at the Arizona State Prison Lewis facility has released its preliminary report.

Lessons Learned

- 69 recommendations from Blue Ribbon Panel
www.blueribbon.az.gov
- 106 Department Opportunities for Improvement
 - Continually update department wide Emergency Response Plan
 - Train with local law enforcement agencies
 - Tactical Commander must know what material facilities are built out of
- Language – Learn the suspect language
- Reinforce the basics (no routine stop)




Interstate Compact

Promises Made – Promises Kept

[T]he negotiator's credibility within the institution and the agency's willingness to follow through with promises made during the crisis are critical to future successes. The inmate grapevine is such that word of unmet promises would spread quickly throughout the inmate population and would make future episodes more difficult to successfully negotiate.

Thomas J. Fagan, Ph.D.



LEWIS PRISON INCIDENT

January 18 – February 1,
2004

